Sociological and economic models of income determination are reviewed: the former lack comprehensiveness and precision and the latter fail to consider social structural variables. A structural theory is proposed which considers the economic stratification of industrial sectors, occupational stratification, and the sexual stratification of society. The data show through the estimation of multiple regression models, that the human capital economic theory is less powerful than a structural-stratification theory in explaining variance in earnings for a national sample of manual workers. Lowest incomes are found in economically weak sectors with unorganized occupational groups disproportionately composed of women workers.
Since economic position is basic to stratification placement in industrial societies and since most people are not self-employed, wage and salary data should be commonplace in the stratification literature. Yet theory and research focusing explicitly on wage differentials have been conspicuously scarce. Sociologists have been preoccupied with other issues, such as the generational transmission of occupational prestige, educational achievement, and similar variations on the attainment theme." As a result, economists, most of whom display an affinity for reclothed nineteenth-century theories, have a virtual monopoly over the study of income.
This paper attempts to identify social determinants of the earnings of bluecollar workers. The principal hypothesis is that for both men and women, the economic models based on human capital investments have limited utility in explaining income and that a structural model which considers the stratification of industries, occupations, and sexes is superior. We shall first review economic and sociological paradigms of earnings, select useful indicators for each, and then apply multiple regression analysis to assess the adequacy of the models for explaining earnings for blue-collar men and women.
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to that of the last worker hired (Fleisher) . Hicks, for instance, argues that in the long run, wages are determined by competitive market forces with institutional factors merely representing "complications." Competitive neoclassical theory does not hypothesize that inequalities in earnings derive from difference in the capital intensiveness, market dominance, and other features of enterprises. As an optimally efficient allocator of resources, the market prices labor solely on the basis of skill difference (Scitovsky) . This follows from assumptions that in a competitive economy, workers will freely seek employment at the highest wage, employers will pay as little as possible for labor of a given quality, and capital will migrate until its marginal revenue product is equalized.
The principal weakness of marginal productivity theory resides in its dubious assumptions: that people are rational; that producers have choice among alternative factors and consumers among products; that a high degree of mobility characterizes goods, services, and workers; that information about markets is widely and quickly available; and that societal institutions are exogenous to income determination. In applying this theory to wages, it is assumed that workers are economically rational, that they have abundant job choices and market information (Rees; Stigler) and that they are always ready to move (Bunting; Burton and Parker; Lansing and Morgan) , thus equalizing net advantages to employment throughout the occupational structure. All these assumptions have been challenged by empirical studies of labor markets. Workers are not always rational (Homans) , have limited job opportunities (Bakke) , are typically ignorant of alternative employment possibilities (McCall; Reynolds) , and often defer moving (Adams and Aronson) . Moreover, the predicted decline in earnings differentials among industries and occupations is often unrealized (Ober; Ozanne; Perlman) .
Economists have long known that some wages seem to be unresponsive to market forces. As early as 1850, for example, Mill observed the presence of noncompeting groups in the labor market. Succeeding economists tended to ignore weaknesses in marginal utility theory and were not eager to face up to socially structured discrimination. But the recent admission or discovery of discrimination has prompted neoclassical economists to revise their theory of wages. The most widely accepted revision is the human capital approach. Proponents of the theory (Becker, b; Mincer; Thurow) allege that, for whatever reasons, the marginal productivities of blacks, women, and other low-income groups is lower than that of better paid white male workers. In the extreme, ceteris paribus, wages are thought to be isomorphic with a ranking of productivity components. As Thurow put it, "the distribution of marginal products is identical with the distribution of earned income" (20) . It is important to emphasize that the human capital approach is not concerned about the causes of discrimination. It simply emphasizes that those who suffer from discrimination exhibit characteristics which make them less productive: low educational attainment, low skill, and poor work attendance; hence, their lower wages.
Typical indicators of human capital include years of formal schooling, vocational training, on-the-job training, amount of work experience, and even motivation (Mincer) . Human capital theory resembles structural-functional stratification theory in characterizing as investments for future higher earnings the financial sacrifices which people make to obtain education: the cost of education and the income foregone during the training period (Davis and Moore) . Both approaches regard positional rank as a product of individual inputs (talents, skills, motivation) and societal outputs, i.e., wages, income, and other rewards (compare Svalastoga and Thurow) . Both theories presuppose a single labor market in which workers are queued according to skills which accord with employer preferences (Thurow) . This labor queue is subject to competitive market forces such that employment and wages are determined in the intersection of employer demand and the labor supply of particular human capital or talent. Thus, for both the human capital and functionalist stratification models, income inequality, poverty, and unemployment flow primarily from the characteristics of individual workers and the functional requisites of a dynamic economy." And, especially with regard to poverty, human capital theory closely resembles the sociological notion of the "vicious circle of poverty," in that low incomes are said to result from cumulative, mutually reinforcing disadvantages over the life cycle (in health, housing, education, motivation, etc.). Both theories reason that policy intervention at any point in the circle will produce "virtuous" repercussions utlimately raising individual incomes.
Sociologists (Parsons and Smelser; Stinchecombe; Weber) have long argued, proponents of marginal theory to the contrary, that workers do not compete in a single labor market. Rather, markets differ with respect to custom (Duwors) , the economic power of the industry (Lynd and Lynd) , the organizational power of the union (Cottrell) , types of occupational sponsorship (Hall) , degree of cohesivenss among workers (Warner and Low) , and job ceilings imposed by employers for races (Cayton and Drake) and sexes (Hiller) .
Instead of considering markets as products of competition, some sociologists have argued that they can be better understood as socially structured mechanisms which link economic and social organization through a wider range of social processes. In industrial societies, the principal structure that links economic and social organizations is the stratification system of society. The sociological task is to demonstrate this linkage more precisely. So far, the demonstration has not gone much beyond the typology stage: Parsons and Smelser have described different markets for labor, executives, and professionals, and Caplow for common labor, craftworkers, and bureaucrats. Form and Huber have described the characteristics of administered, self-controlled, traditional, contested, and free markets. These typologies consider the relative power of occupational groups to control recruitment, working conditions, and income but they typically omit two organizational realities: (1) the relative economic and organizational power of enterprises to control their markets, and (2) the articulation of societal stratification mechanisms with the enterprises and occupational groups within them. In short, a sociological theory of wages must consider in stratification terms the organizational interlocking of enterprises, occupational groups, and the society. Unfortunately, sociologists have not proposed a theory of sufficient simplicity, coherence, and power which can predict specific incomes and income changes. They are still at the stage where important variables are examined post hoc for their influence on income.
THREE STRATIFICATION ENTITIES: FIRM, OCCUPATION, AND SOCIETAL STATUS
In proposing a sociological explanation of wages, we must identify structural variables which can be compared with industrial variables for their power in explaining blue-collar earnings. The first element in the structural model deals with the stratification of industrial establishments in terms of their material and organizational resources and their ability to pay high wages. In the top stratum, often referred to as constituting "center" establishments by economists (Averitt; Bluestone) , are large capital intensive oligopolistic firms which practice economies of scale and earn relatively high and stable profits (Galbraith) . Their managers and technical staff can therefore command the highest salaries and their employees can command the highest wages because they belong to large and powerful unions.
In the bottom stratum are found "periphery" establishments which have few material and organizational resources. These firms are typically small, geographically scattered, and labor intensive. They have many competitors, uncertain profits, and pay the lowest wages because they operate in free markets in which competitors are unable to influence the economic forces affecting them. Establishments which fall in between the top and bottom strata vary in the characteristics we have described.
Since it is difficult to gather national wage data on the basis of the organizational characteristics of firms, indicators which tap a wide range of organizational characteristics must be selected. Most of these indicators broadly reflect the technology of the enterprise. For example, the industrial sector to which the firm belongs (manufacturing, construction, transportation and utilities, wholesale and retail trade, or services) reflects a characteristic technology. Second, technology is associated with enterprise size: large firms tend to have technologies which require enormous concentrations of capital. Third, firms with complex technolgies tend to be located in metropolitan centers because (a) they need to be close to major suppliers and markets, (b) they must have ready access to good transportation facilities, and (c) they need complex supportive services and highly trained, disciplined labor forces. Moreover, since enterprises with costly technologies make long-term investments, they try to insure stability of operations by pursuing oligopolistic practices, administering prices and profits, and demanding a cooperative labor force. The superior market and profit position of top stratum enterprises enables them to pay high wages, a precondition for the emergence of powerful occupational groups.
The second element in the structural model deals with the stratification of occupational groups in terms of their organizational power to extract high wages from management. The strength of an occupational group primarily depends on two conditions: the extent of which its members possess scarce skills which are in high demand and the extent to which workers are cohesively organized. Skill composition of the workforce and extent of its unionization are the two indicators we shall use to stratify occupational groups. Skilled workers are generally more socially cohesive and better able to control their work environment than unskilled workers. The informal power of occupational groups tends to be reflected in their skill composition (Blauner; Sayles). Labor unions provide organizational power to occupational groups lacking in skill and supplement the informal power of skilled workers. A basic tenet of our theory is that the economic stratification of enterprises is matched by the organizational power of occupational groups. Unions are strongest in industries which have organizational characteristics making for easy unionization: the need for special skills, physical concentration of many workers in a small area, large and steady profits, location in areas where other large firms compete for workers, and dependence on a skilled or disciplined labor force (Mahler) . Bottom stratum establishments have organizational characteristics associated with powerless occupational groups: small size, low skill requirements, geographic dispersion, labor intensive modes of production, low profits, location in small communities or ghetto areas, and socially heterogeneous and socially disadvantaged employees. Workers in such enterprises have low social cohesion and, consequently, they are difficult to unionize (Goode and Fowler) . 4 The third element in the structural model deals with the stratal location of the labor force in the community stratification system. A tenet of the model is that workers in favored social strata are employed in enterprises with the greatest economic strength and in occupations with the greatest organizational power. The task of both the human capital and structural models is to explain why some groups in the community are denied access to favored enterprises or occupational groups. The human capital model suggests that groups disadvantaged by ethnicity, race, or sex are denied access because they are unproductive. The structural theory, in contrast, suggests that they are denied access by purposive social action on the part of employers, unions, and other dominant groups, and that these individuals and organizations justify their behavior with an elaborate economic and stratification ideology.
The data available for this research do not permit us to consider all the societal stratification variables (age, race, ethnicity, sex) in the structural model. The exclusive focus on sex requires an explanation since women are not typically considered a stratum in stratification theory. In pre-industrial societies, the sexual segregation of economic functions was necessitated in part by the restriction of the woman's physical mobility imposed by pregnancy, lactation, and childcare responsibilities while male roles (hunting, trade, warfare) necessitated mobility (Boserup; Friedl) . In industrial socieites, the mechanization of production, the elimination of economic functions in the home, the reduction of family size, compulsory education for both men and women, technological changes in medicine, childcare, and home maintenance made it organizationally possible for both men and women to engage in similar occupations. The persistence of the sexual stratification of occupations must therefore be explained in terms of power arrangements in the family, occupational groups, and firms.
Meissner's study shows not only that the husband's pattern of household and childcare responsibilities remains unchanged by the wife's labor force participation, but men actually increase their non-home leisure time activities while the employed wife's work load doubles that of her husband. Even when women work full-time for many years, their wages are regarded as supplemental income and their work as unimportant. Occupational stereotyping on the part of the male estate restricts the occupational placement and labor mobility of women to the labor market area of the
husband's choosing and to his work schedule. The conflict between management and unions is subordinated to a "higher understanding" that the good (high paying) jobs belong to men. This consensus makes it possible for managers in both capitalistic and socialistic countries to assign women lower wages even when they perform the same work as men. The dominant sex-role ideology prompts women workers, as well as their employers, to view female labor force activity as providing supplementary earnings. For this reason, employers often feel justified in paying women lower wages. Finally, male chauvinism in the unions, the dispersed nature of the jobs and industries in which women are found, and women's need for easier mobility in and out of the labor force hinder union organization in industries disproportionately employing females.
The basic principle of a structural theory of income is that enterprises, occupational groups, and society are stratified along different dimensions: how the strata in these three arenas intersect explains the wages of any particular group. The low income of blue-collar women cannot be explained by individual variables in a human capital model but by the merging of three low strata: economically weak enterprises in the peripheral sector, occupational groups with weak organizational power, and the subordinated estate of women in society.
RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA SOURCE, AND VARIABLES IN THE ANALYSIS
Data in the analysis are from the University of Michigan Survey Research Center's
1972-73 Quality of Employment Survey, a companion to research initiated in 1969
by the Employment Standards Administration of the U. S. Department of Labor (Quinn and Shepard) . Both studies were undertaken to investigate working conditions and quality of employment, job satisfaction, and importance ratings of work attributes. Persons eligible for interview were household members at least 16 years old and gainfully employed for twenty or more hours per week. From the national sample of 2,157 individuals, we selected all full-time" blue-collar workers in the civilian nonagricultural labor force, yielding a subsample of 1,004 cases. The respondents reported employment in eight major Census industry groups: mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation-communications-utilities, wholesale and retail trade, finance-insurance-real estate, services (including business and repair, professional, entertainment, and personal services), and public administration. Occupational categories included skilled workers and foremen, operatives, transportation operatives, laborers, service workers, and private household workers.
The analysis compares the traditional human capital model of income determination with the structural-stratification model described in the foregoing paragraphs. We hypothesize that multiple regression analyses of earnings will show that incomes of blue-collar workers cannot be accounted for primarily by referring to the human capital characteristics of individuals. Specifically, the independent contribution of labor quality factors (education, cumulative experience with the current employer, attachment to the labor force, and general vocational training) to income should be substantially smaller than the contribution of factors associated with the structural framework (stratal location of the firm's economic sector, power of occupational groups, and sex composition of the labor force). We further hypothesize that the superiority of a social structural model over the human capital explanation will remain when the data are disaggregated by sex.
Variables in the analysis were operationalized as follows: The dependent variable, annual earnings, refers to the total wage or salary income received by respondents in 1971 in their regular jobs. The independent variables fall into three main categories: (1) human capital investments of individuals, (2) economic and organizational features of enterprises and occupations, and (3) the stratification of sexes. The human capital variables include education (coded as years of formal schooling completed), length of tenure with current employer (scored 1 = less than a month to 7 = more than twenty years), specific vocational preparation-SVP-or amount of vocational or on-the-job training (scored 1 = less than a month to 6 = four or more years)," and an indicator of the worker's attachment to the labor force formed by computing a ratio of cumulative labor force experience to potential labor force experience, i.e., age minus years of schooling plus six.
The second set of variables deal with characteristics of the firm. To parallel the economists' distinction between the primary or core industrial sector and the secondary peripheral sector, we grouped major Census industries into two strata. The core sector of the economy (scored 1) includes durable goods manufacturing, selected nondurable goods industries," mining, construction, transportation and public utilities, and government. The peripheral sector (scored 0) includes the services, wholesale and retail trade, finance, and selected nondurable goods manufacturing. Another industry characteristic, enterprise size, (scored 1 = less than 25 employees, 2 = 25 to 99, 3 = 100 to 250, and 4 = over 250 employees) was included because of its association with other economic factors, such as the tendency for large firms to be capital intensive (Lester) and oligopolistic in their product markets (Weiss) . Finally, residence in a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (dubbed LOCATION and coded as a dummy variable) was included because the highest paying industries are located in major metropolitan areas. While SMSA residence is frequently construed as reflecting South-non-south income differences, Fuchs has discovered substantial city size effects on earnings controlling for region. However, his explanation leaves much to be desired: city size is considered merely a proxy for a "high quality" (i.e., better educated) labor force and hence devoid of independent contribution. By incorporating both SMSA residence and education in our regression specifications, Fuchs' argument will be tested.
The third set of variables deal with occupational power. Skill level, dubbed OCCGROUP, was coded 1 = unskilled laborer or service worker, 2 = semi-skilled operative, and 3 = skilled craftworker or foreman. Skill level was included because craftworkers are known to be able to control their work environments more effectively than the less skilled (Sayles) . Major occupational groups differ in their capacity to control wage determining market forces such as the exclusive operation of expensive equipment, the recruitment, training, and certification of workers, and the determination of working conditions." Unionization, coded as a dummyized membership variable, was included because unions are attracted to industries which Stratification & Wages / 981 are easier to organize and which have higher profit margins (Dunlop) . 9 Moreover, unions tend to invest occupational groups with organizational power.
A final societal variable, sex (scored 1 = female and 0 = male) was included in the analysis because we believe that both the market and occupational groups respond particularistically to women's subordinate estate.
DATA ANALYSIS
Detailed comparisons of the human capital and structural-stratification models of earnings are presented later, but a preliminary analysis of their parameters may be derived from data presented in Tables 1-4 . As suggested, the economic power of enterprises and the social power of occupational groups are reflected in the earnings of workers. The stratification of industrial sectors is demonstrated in Table 1 where blue-collar earnings for males in mining, public administration, and transportation are over 1.5 times greater than earnings in the lowest paid sector. Earnings in the construction industry and manufacturing fall into a middle stratum, roughly 1.4 times those in the service enterprises. For blue-collar women, interindustry differences in earnings are even more dramatic. In short, the lowest earnings are in the labor intensive sectors of finance, trade, and services and the highest in the more capital intensive sectors.
If the distribution of blue-collar earnings among major industry groups can be attributed primarily to differences in the market capacity of enterprises, the pattern of earnings within industries undoubtedly reflects the power alignments of
Table1. MEDIAN EARNINGS, UNION MEMBERSHIP, AND SEX COMPOSITION OF EMPLOYMENT FOR BLUE C( WORKERS IN CIVILIAN NON-AGRICULTURAL lABOR FORCE, BY MAJOR INDUSTRY GROUP

Median Earnings Ratio Earnings Union
Women as a PE participating occupational groups. Where the dispersion of earnings is broad, occupational groups probably vary with respect to their organizational power; where earnings are concentrated, occupational groups are either weak or strong depending on where they are in the distribution. For instance, earnings among blue-collar workers in transportation-communication-utilities and in the service industries are highly concentrated yet at opposite ends of the income ladder (see Table 2 ). This pattern probably stems from the presence of strong unions in the former industry group and their absence or weakness in the latter (see Table 2 ). The importance of sex stratification on blue-collar earnings, without regard to industry affiliation, is shown in Table 3 which compares the distribution of workers within income categories according to the percentage of women in various occupations as reported in the Census. Expectedly, over three-quarters of the workers in predominantly (over 85%) "male" blue-collar jobs fall into the two highest income strata, while half of all workers located in predominantly (over 75%) "female" occupations fall into the lowest earnings stratum. How industry, occupation, and sex stratification affect earnings can be readily discerned in Table 4 . Women earn substantially less than men in all major occupational groups whether in the top industrial stratum or in the periphery. The least skilled male laborers and service workers in the capital intensive stratum are economically better off than the most skilled in the peripheral stratum. Clearly, both sexes are disadvantaged by employment in the peripheral economy, but sexual earnings inequality in identical occupational groups is generally less pronounced in the bottom than the top industrial stratum. This situation suggests that the greater propensity of blue-collar men to organize does not payoff as well in the economically disadvantaged and more competitive trade and service industries.
The descriptive statistics in Tables 1-4 , however dramatic, do not speak directly to the issue of whether earnings can best be explained by the human capital or the social structural model. The heart of our analysis involves the intercorrelations of variables in both models and basic multiple regression estimates of the effects of [tncludes durable goods manufacturing, selected nondurable goods industries, mining, construction,transportation, and public utilities, and government. :j:lncludes combined services, wholesale-retail trade, finance, and selected nondurable goods manufacturing.
these variables on blue-collar earnings, computed first for the general sample and then for males and females separately. Table 5 presents means, standard deviations, and a matrix of intercorrelations among all variables used in the aggregate analysis. Here, the correlations of the variables with earnings show stronger support for the structural-stratification than for the human capital model. As anticipated, the societal variable, sex, shows the highest correlation with earnings, followed in order by the occupational, industrial, and human capital factors. The correlations of the human capital variables (Xl -.\4) with the other sets of determinants are generally small, with the obvious exception that vocational training is moderately correlated with occupation and tenure with union membership. On the other hand, half of the industry variables (X s -X 7 ) show moderately high correlations with the occupational terms (X s -Xg) while both of the occupational variables are negatively correlated with sex (female). The suggestion in the economics literature that while top stratum industries pay better wages, they obtain a higher quality labor force in the bargain (cf. Weiss), is not supported by our data. Instead, it appears that the inter-sector \0 
distribution of well-educated, vocationally trained, loyal workers is remarkably random. Using these correlations, we now estimate three linear multiple regression models corresponding to (I) a human capital explanation, (2) our structural model linking the stratification of industries, occupational groups, and sexes, and (3) a composite specification incorporating the effects of both models. Table 6 presents the results of regressing blue-collar annual earnings on all indicators of the three models. Figures in the upper panel denote standardized regression (beta) coefficients; corresponding raw regression coefficients and their standard errors of estimate appear immediately beneath. Referring to the coefficients of determination (R 2 ) for models 1 and 2 respectively, our stratification model is shown to provide superior explanatory power for blue-collar earnings: it explains nearly three times as much variance in the dependent variable as the human capital approach, i.e., 50 percent as compared to 18 percent.
The relative importance of the determinants can be apprehended by referring to the magnitude of the standardized coefficients in the composite regression. The fully specified model explains exactly 55.1 percent of the variance in annual earnings among blue-collar workers. The preponderance of industry, occupational, and stratification effects over human capital effects in determining earnings is suggested by the comparatively large coefficients for sex, location in an SMSA, union membership, and core sector employment. Together these four variables contribute two-thirds of the total explanatory power of the model, net of education, tenure, and general vocational training.
Recalling Fuchs' contention that the higher income of city workers is probably a manifestation of superior education, we note that the direct effect of SMSA location exceeds that of education. Living in a metropolitan area is worth about $1,164 for the blue-collar worker, controlling for education. That city effects cannot be attributed to schooling immediately raises the question of what city characteristics are relevant, a problem beyond the scope of the analysis at hand. One possible explanation may be that as city size increases, local opportunity structures tend to diversify, thus increasing the range of opportunities for workers to capitalize on their special competences and to organize their occupations for wage bargaining. Moreover, the geographic concentration of economically powerful enterprises in SMSAs is accompanied by the geographic concentration of large unions. Raphael and Gillaspy demonstrated in Pennsylvania a link between the technology of industries, their location, and their wages. Where advances in mechanization reduce dependence on highly paid male craftworkers, some industries migrate to smaller communities and employ women for less skilled jobs because, there, women have few alternative sources of employment. But, more importantly, industries with primitive mechanical technologies stay in smaller communities, employ low-paid women workers, and inhibit their migration to metropolitan areas.
Another powerful determinant of blue-collar earnings is employment sector. Even in the completely specified model, the metric coefficient associated with this variable is large. The economic strength of the industrial sector is a powerful factor influencing workers' incomes: to be employed in the core rather than in the peripheral sector is, for the typical worker, worth nearly $1,200. To be sure, a substantial portion of the relationship is attributable to the fact that the stratification of industries coincides with the stratification of sex estates: jobs in the bottom peripheral sector are disproportionately reserved for women. Proponents of the human capital model are apt to respond that this line of reasoning is spurious because it obscures the fact that women and other minorities Stratification & Wages / 987 are deficient in human capital, and this deficiency alone accounts for the low productivities and low earnings. However, the impact of sex stratification on earnings is only negligibly mediated by schooling because, as we shall see, the educational biographies of blue-collar men and women scarcely differ. In fact, the understandardized regression coefficient for education suggests that an increase in formal schooling from eight years to high school graduation would increase yearly earnings by only $595 (or about $149 for each additional year) when all other factors are taken into account. By way of contrast, union membership is worth $1,096 net of other factors. Adding length of employment with current employer and labor force attachment does not seem to dramatically attenuate the direct effect of being female. Although the measure of vocational training (SVP) fares somewhat better in this respect, it leaves the observed effect of sex on earnings substantially unexplained. Indeed, the actual dollar cost to the typical female worker is over $3,900 annually, ceteris paribus. Insight into how this differential arises can best be achieved by reestimating the three models disaggregated by sex, thereby illuminating differences in the wage determination process for men and women.
Table6. COEFFICIENTS FOR THREE MODELS OF EARNINGS FOR BLUECOLLAR WORKERS (standard errors in parentheses)
THE INCOME DETERMINATION PROCESS FOR MALE AND FEMALE BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS
Means, standard deviations, and correlation matrices for the models disaggregated by sex appear in Table 7 . Perhaps the most striking feature is the similarity of male and female mean values on the human capital variables and dissimilarity with respect to industry sector, union membership, and occupational affiliation. While blue-collar women, on the average, trail men in educational attainment by about two months, they are more than twice as likely to be found in the periphery and about half as likely to be union members.
Ironically, while women closely approximate men in their human capital investments, these factors are far less important for women in determining their income. Coefficients of determination for models 1 and 2 in Table 8 reveal that wages among women are more strongly determined by the structural characteristics of firms and occupations: our stratification model explains 24 percent of the variance in women's earnings but only 18 percent of males'. Men appear to be at a considerable advantage in capitalizing on education, vocational preparation, and lengthy tenure.
Referring now to the composite specification (model 3), we note that significant sexual disparities persist for most of the determinants. Education and vocational training continue to provide less payoff for women. The single most important determinant in the female equation, as gauged by the beta coefficients, appears to be the industry variable, enterprise size. For men, tenure with the present employer is most important probably because of the concentration of male bluecollar workers in core firms where internal labor markets reward orderly career progression. Thus, since training and education have been netted out as "produc- tivity" components, tenure may be construed as a proxy for seniority. Given males' favorable industrial and occupational distributions, together with their superior organizational clout, the rewards accruing to lengthy seniority are obvious. While union membership figures prominently in the wage determination process of blue-collar males, women, when viewed across industries and occupations, appear to derive no economic advantage by joining unions.!" In fact, organized women workers in the aggregate earn on the average about $30 less than their nonunion counterparts. At first blush, this defies conventional wisdom, but it probably reflects the fact that unions with the majority of women members are concentrated in low-paying industries as, for example, hospitals, restaurants, and other various services. J. Lewis, probing the wage effects of unions on black incomes, reached substantially the same conclusion about the type of industries and occupations in which blacks are organized. For blue-collar women, employment in unionized low-stratum industries is more of an economic liability than employment in nonunionized large manufacturing firms.
That the economic power of large firms shelters women from the ravages of the market in much the same way as the social power of unions protects blue-collar men is suggested in Table 9 . Across industry sectors and occupational groups, firm size for women substitutes for males' more effective union organization in providing higher earnings. The importance of firm size is most important for women who are unskilled and service employees while for men the union is more effective than firm size at all skill levels (see Table 10 ).
Table9. ASSOCIATIONS (GAMMAS) BETWEEN EARNINGS AND ENTERPRISE SIZEAND UNION MEMBERSHIP, BY SEX AND INDUSTRY SECTOR
Women Men
Core Sector 
DISCUSSION
The foregoing analysis has located an important nexus of blue-collar earnings inequality in the stratification of enterprises, occupational groups, and sexual estates. We have discovered that, on the average, the median annual earnings of working-class men and women differ by as much as $5,000 (see Table 7 ). How to apportion this differential among human capital and stratification components of labor markets remains to be shown, although we have already demonstrated in a general fashion the superiority of the effects of industry and occupational variables. A cogent strategy would be to compare actual dollar earnings increases for bluecollar women after (1) equalizing their human capital investments with those of men, and subsequently, (2) distributing them among industry sectors, locations, occupational groups, etc., as males are. Since the dollar rates of return on these variables (reflected in the metric regression coefficients) are known for women, we simply substitute mean male values in the female equation. Doing this, we discover that increasing women's human capital investments to accord with the investments made by men yields a total increase in annual earnings of only $195. Merely raising women's educational attainment to equal men's nets only $21, while providing women with vocational training on a par with blue-collar males is worth an additional $82. On the other hand, if women are assigned locational, sectoral, and occupational distributions identical to those of men, they might expect an average earnings increase of about $430. Thus, again, we conclude that human capital investments are less crucial in the income biographies of blue-collar women than industrial and occupational stratification.
Admittedly, we have accounted for only a portion of the earnings differential between the sexes by resorting to a substitution of means approach. Yet, when we consider that a redistribution of women among industries and occupational groups would necessarily imply a larger redistribution of men and, hence, a substantial decrease in average male earnings, the residual inequality appears much smaller. Further, we can be reasonably certain that the inequality which remains must stem from at least one of the following general sources: (1) additional income rewarding forms of human capital not specified in the model, (2) subtleties in the occupational distributions of the sexes not captured in our variables, and (3) direct economic discrimination against women. Regarding the first, formal schooling, vocational or on-the-job training, length of tenure with one's employer, and actual attachment to the labor force have been controlled and we are hardpressed to think of additional important human capital investments. On the other hand, despite passage of the 1964 Equal Pay Act, lackadaisical enforement has probably contributed to the persistence of discrimination against women. But, more importantly, within both core and peripheral sectors and within major occupational groups, blue-collar women usually occupy the lowest paying, least desirable positions, a nuance not reflected in our aggregate measures. As laborers and service workers, women are disproportionately found as laundresses, domestics, and waitresses while unskilled males are found in better-paid occupations such as longshoremen, barbers, construe-tion laborers, and cooks. Similarly, sex stratification probably extends into the core industrial sectors with males hegemonizing employment in the best jobs regardless of skill.
Other literature lends support to this notion. Hodge and Hodge have shown that the entry of women into many occupations has been attended by progressively deteriorating wages. They argue that employers need not bid high to attract workers into jobs disproportionately filled by women. Similarly, Taeuber et aI., and Treiman and Terrell (b) report that women fill low paying jobs abandoned by men who enter better paying ones. Women filled such jobs during World War II, but after the war they were expelled, thus increasing competition for low-wage employment. 11 To determine the magnitude of the crowding of women into a small number of industries, all 55 three-digit industrial categories of employment reported in the Quality of Employment Survey were scrutinized. We selected a random sample of 328 men from the 581 total to match the total number of women respondents in the sample and noted their distributions in the industries which hired the largest number of men and women workers respectively. Half of the men were found in 15 industries which had the largest concentrations of male employees, while half of the women appeared in only 5 industries which were heavily female. The two largest industries (building and motor vehicles) employed only 15 percent of the men, while the two largest for women (textile manufacturing and hospitals) employed 25 percent of the female workers.
The allocation of blue-collar women to low paying, predominantly serviceoriented jobs reflects what Smelser terms the "stratificational boundaries" of economic life. Historically, labor markets have been racially and ethnically segmented with dominant groups restricting subordinate group access to the better paying jobs (Bonacich; Cayton and Drake). While some writers (cf. Becker, a) contend that everyone loses by such arrangements, in the sense that they pay a luxury tax for indulging their taste for discrimination, recent evidence (Bergmann) suggests that workers from the dominant ethnic group derive modest, yet tangible benefits from the overrepresentation of minorities in the low paying jobs of the bottom stratum enterprises. Whether the wages of white males who remain in sectors increasingly staffed by minorities suffer from competition is still unclear. Hodge and Hodge argue that blacks and women pose a competitive threat to the earnings of white male workers and that some jobs are low paying because minorities are willing to work for less. Other researchers (Taeuber et al.) have found that the low pay of some occupations occurs independently of their occupancy by minority workers. Our data suggest a more complex explanation: while bottom stratum enterprises may be inefficient and marginally profitable, sex stratification mediates industrial stratification to prolong their economic survival.
The disproportionate allocation of blue-collar women to some industrial sectors and their conspicuous absence in others should surprise no one acquainted with census data. What is less understood is how women's manual jobs are distributed in manufacturing enterprises which vary in economic strength and, especially, in the economically powerful enterprises. We suspect that analyses of the
internal markets of such firms will reveal stratification patterns similar to those found in this intersector analysis. Whether the depressed earnings of female manual workers derive from the way they are socialized not to compete for higher paying jobs or whether they result from conscious market discrimination, the occupational and industrial segregation of women culminates in two related market processes: (1) in the absence of competition from women, the labor supply curve for male dominated industries shifts left, increasing the equilibrium wage for men, and (2) the separation of women in female dominated industries shifts the labor supply curve there to the right, lowering the equilibrium wage for women. 12 The relatively small sample used in this study has limited our analysis to women as a whole as well as to rather global industry and occupational categories. But women vary in their stratal and social location in society. The analysis would be improved by determining how the ethnic or racial status of blue-collar women affects their market allocation in different types of communities (large or small, one dominant industry or industrially heterogeneous, North or South, etc.) and among detailed 3-digit jobs and industries. The recently available Public Use Samples of the 1970 Census make the exploration of these problems possible. 13 This paper has focused on only one aspect of earnings inequality for blue-collar women. The weakness of the human capital variables in explaining their earnings suggests that women operate under unique market and institutional arrangements. These arrangements are better understood when the economic stratification of enterprises is considered as interacting with occupational groups of varying organizational power and the stratification of society into sexual estates. The open acknowledgment of sex discrimination in the economy today has stimulated government and women's groups to reduce it. Their current ineffectiveness attests to the strength and invisibility of the institutional arrangements which perpetuate the sexual stratification of labor markets. NOTES l. Duncan et aI., Sewell and Hauser, Treiman and Terrell (a) , and others have extended the attainment model for occupational mobility to income, but this approach does not consider the market and economic organizations as variables. 2. Radical economic theory (e.g., Gordon; Sweezy) is a competing paradigm which considers capitalist institutions as structuring labor markets and as deserving analysis. 3. Grandjean's trenchant explication of the functionalist theory of stratification found that while talent and training had some influence on social rewards, the effect of "functional importance" was not discernible through economic analysis. 4. Goode's and Fowler's early study verged on the formalization of a sociological theory of income distribution by explicitly identifying the differential power of occupational groups in the market. 5. Employed at least 35 hours per week. 6. For detailed Census occupations, SVP measures the amount of training time required to learn the techniques associated with an average performance in a specific job-worker situation. Specific vocational preparation includes training obtained from vocational education, apprenticeships, in-plant instruction, on-the-job training, or essential experience in other jobs. 7. Averitt's five-factor classification of manufacturing industries was followed in allocating nondurable goods enterprises between core and peripheral sectors. Thus, due to their key location with respect to other industries, market concentration, capital intensive modes of production, vertical integration, etc., the following manufacturing industries are considered to be core: chemicals and allied products, petroleum and coal, and rubber and miscellaneous plastics. Not exhibiting core features in Averitt's typology are the food industries, tobacco manufactures, textiles, apparels, paper and allied products, and printing. 8. To test for nonlinearities in the relationship between occupational group and earnings, two preliminary regression analyses made use of, respectively, a dummyized Skilled vs. "Other" variable and the Unskilled vs. "Other" variable. Regression estimates proved to be superior in the present case using the intervalized three category occupation factor. 9. The issue whether unionized workers earn higher wages than nonunion workers is distinct from the question whether unions have increased the income share of labor as a whole. Many economists feel that unions have not garnered a larger portion of the pie for labor and that their gains have been won at the expense of unorganized workers rather than privileged strata (cf. Johnson and Miezkowski). 10. Whether unionization produces significant net increases in earnings within occupations and industries which employ predominantly women remains an unresolved issue. Without regard to industry sex composition, most available data suggest that unions do produce modest wage advantages within detailed industries, usually on the order of 4-7 percent. But the relative wage effects of unionization have been shown to vary dramatically from 42 percent net advantage in the male dominated bituminous coal industry to virtually no effect in the female dominated footwear, cotton textile, and men's clothing industries (H. Lewis). In general, the ability of unions to wring wage concessions from employers is constrained by the technological makeup of industries and the nature of the market firms confront. 11. McNally showed that while women accounted for 29 percent of all blue-collar manufacturing workers in 1947, in 1967 they accounted for only 19 percent. 12. See Fusfeld for a discussion of the effects of imbalanced labor supply on the marginal productivities and wages of "primary" and "secondary" workers in ghetto labor markets. 13. We should caution that many important indicators of the determinants of earnings, including union membership, firm size, and length of work experience are not available in the Census User Tapes or in the published volumes. To construct adequately specified income determination models similar to those in our analysis would require that Census records be supplemented with data drawn from other sources. Our decision to opt for the Quality ofEmployment Survey to estimate exploratory models was dictated in part by these considerations.
